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Abstract—While direct social ties have been intensely studied
in the context of computer-mediated social networks, indirect ties
(e.g., friends of friends) have seen little attention. Yet in real life,
we often rely on friends of our friends for recommendations (of
good doctors, good schools, or good babysitters), for introduction
to a new job opportunity, and for many other occasional needs. In
this work we attempt to 1) quantify the strength of indirect social
ties, 2) validate it, and 3) empirically demonstrate its usefulness
for distributed applications on two examples.
We quantify social strength of indirect ties using a(ny)
measure of the strength of the direct ties that connect two people
and the intuition provided by the sociology literature. We validate
the proposed metric experimentally by comparing correlations
with other direct social tie evaluators. We show via data-driven
experiments that the proposed metric for social strength can be
used successfully for social applications. Specifically, we show that
it alleviates known problems in friend-to-friend storage systems
by addressing two previously documented shortcomings: reduced
set of storage candidates and data availability correlations. We
also show that it can be used for predicting the effects of a social
diffusion with an accuracy of up to 93.5%.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mining of the huge corpus of social data now available
in digital format led to significant advances of our under-
standing of social relationships [1] and social behavior [2],
and confirmed on larger datasets long standing results from
sociology. In addition, social information (mainly relating
people via declared relationships on online social networks
or via computer-mediated interactions) has been successfully
used for a variety of applications, from spam filtering [3] to
recommendations [4] and peer-to-peer backup systems [5].
All these efforts, however, focused typically on direct ties.
Direct social ties (that is, who is directly connected to whom in
the social graph) are natural to observe and reasonably easy to
classify as strong or weak [6], [7]. Indirect social ties, though,
defined as a relationship between two individuals who have no
direct relation but are connected through a third person in their
social network [8], carry a significantly larger potential as they
facilitate better information dissemination then direct ties [9]
and enable significantly better opportunities [10]. Computer-
mediated applications, we conjecture, have a more significant
potential in mining and exploiting indirect ties, as the direct
ties are likely to be used via the traditional channels through
which were used for thousands of years: hopefully people
will continue to talk to friends about needs and opportunities
without totally relying on online social applications.
However, not all indirect ties are valuable or usable,
even at short distances (i.e., 2 hops). For example, a distant
acquaintance of a mere acquaintance is unlikely to have the
social incentives of doing a personal favor, such as sharing his
available storage on his personal computer. Moreover, the trust
is possibly too diluted in such conditions: why would that weak
distant social contact trust that the data he is asked to store
is not illegal or malicious? In addition, what works for a user
or an application might not work for another user or another
application: the indirect tie A–B may be strong enough for A
to use, but not enough for B to use; or it may be strong enough
to use for a backup application, but not for a distributed social
clustering application. Therefore, quantifying the strength of
an indirect tie is both necessary and non-trivial.
In this paper we propose a metric that we call social
strength that numerically estimates the strength of an indirect
tie (Section III). Our metric uses various observations from so-
ciology and builds on the current opportunities of quantifying
the strength of direct ties from computer or phone-recorded
interactions. We rely on the sociology literature to define the
requirements of such a metric: first, since social relationships
are asymmetrically reciprocal [11], the social strength of an
indirect tie consequently needs to be asymmetrical as well.
Second, a friend of many of one’s friends—thus connected via
multiple 2-hop paths—can potentially be more socially “close”
than the friend of a friend, connected via only one 2-hop path.
Third, the strength of an indirect tie decreases with the length
of the shortest path [12].
We partially validate the social strength metric of indirect
ties (in Section IV) using real datasets. We demonstrate the
usefulness of our metric on two proof-of-concept applications:
the recruitment of storage candidates from indirect social ties
(Section V) and the prediction of information dissemination
paths (Section VI). We show experimentally that two main
issues identified in friend-to-friend storage systems, namely
reduced candidate sets [5] and low availability due to time
synchronization among friends [13], are significantly alleviated
by employing our social strength metric for the recruitment of
socially close indirect contacts. Specifically, online availability
of storage resources are improved by up to 20%. We also show
that the social strength metric predicts with an accuracy of up
to 93.5% diffusion paths 2-3 steps ahead to provide more time
for decision makers for containing damaging information dis-
semination (i.e., damaging rumors) or accelerating information
spreading.
II. RELATED WORK
Since Granovetter [9] introduced the notion of strength of
ties in social networks, there have been many studies on tie
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strength measurement. Common Neighbors [14] is a measure
of tie strength that considers the number of common activities
or friends that two users share. Jaccard index [15] was shown
to estimate the number of phone calls between two users by
considering their shared neighborhoods [16].
Homophily, or similarity between individuals, has been
shown to be a catalyst for the formation of relationships [17]
and has been leveraged to predict the existence and strength of
social ties. Gilbert and Karahalios [7] modeled tie strength as a
combination of social dimensions such as intensity, intimacy,
duration, and structure. Crandall et al. [18] investigated the
existence of social ties between people from co-occurrence
in time and space on Flickr and discovered that even a
small number of co-occurrences indicate a high probability
of an existing tie between two users. Likewise, Kahanda and
Neville [6] developed a supervised learning predictor that
classifies a link in OSNs as either a weak or strong tie
via features from user profiles, graph topology, transactional
connectivity and network-transactional connectivity features.
Adamic and Adar [19] introduced a log-based similarity metric
to capture tie strength between indirectly connected nodes.
However, these methods either need extra information—
such as users’ profiles, the message content or users’ geo-
locations—or adopt complex models that cannot be imple-
mented in a decentralized fashion. More importantly, most
previous methodologies simply treat users’ relationships sym-
metrically. Without asymmetric discrimination, it is difficult to
accurately capture the strength of social ties [20].
This work builds on our preliminary definitions [21], [22]
of social strength metric but significantly changes them by
introducing new lessons from sociology. Most importantly,
this work contributes the validation of the social metric and
demonstrates its value via proof-of-concepts applications that
use it.
III. SOCIAL STRENGTH DEFINITION
We want to define a metric that quantifies the intensity
of a social connection between indirectly connected nodes in
a social network. The need for such a metric is intuitively
supported by many sociological studies and is also well
understood from daily life: friends of friends are an important
resource for information and useful social contacts.
In our attempt to quantify an indirect social tie, we use the
following observations from sociology and from recent data-
driven studies on computer-mediated social relationships:
O1: The strength of a direct social relationship is influenced
by the amount of interactions, as confirmed in [9], [23].
Moreover, interactions among OSN users were shown to
represent more meaningful relations than just declared
relationships [24]. Consequently, in the quantification of an
indirect social tie, we rely on a numerical representation
of the strength of a direct social tie, that can be expressed
as number of interactions, number of shared interests, or
other recordable outcomes, depending on the semantic of
the relationship.
O2: Intuitively, the social strength of an indirect relationship
on a particular social path is limited by the strength of the
weakest direct tie on that path. Furthermore, the strength of
an indirect tie decreases with the length of the shortest path
between the two individuals. This has been qualitatively
observed by Friedkin [12], who concluded that the horizon
of observability is limited to a distance of 2 hops. Without
contradicting this result, in this work we propose that
instead of limiting indirect social ties to a distance of 2,
we allow the calculation of social strength along longer
distances, but decrease its value as a function of distance.
O3: Multiple types of social interactions (for example, both
professional collaboration and playing tennis after work)
result into a stronger (direct) relationship than only one
type of interaction [25]. Furthermore, sociology stud-
ies [12] observed that the relationship strength of indirectly
connected individuals greatly depends on the number of
different direct or indirect paths connecting them. There-
fore, we consider the strength of multiple shortest paths in
our definition of the strength of an indirect social tie.
O4: Typically, social ties between individuals are asymmetri-
cally reciprocal [11]. Thus, for the directly connected users
Alice and Bob, the importance of their mutual relationship
may be dramatically different. Different experiences, psy-
chological backgrounds and personal histories cause these
asymmetries [26]. We want to preserve this asymmetry
in quantifying indirect ties, such that Alice and Charlie,
indirectly connected via Bob, are entitled to have different
views about their indirect tie.
Therefore, to quantify the social strength of an indirect
social tie between users i and m we consider relationships
at any n (n ≥ 2) social hops, where n is the shortest path
between i and m. We assume a weighted interaction graph
model that connects users with edges weighted based on the
intensity of their direct social interactions. Assuming that Pni,m
is the set of different shortest paths of length n joining two
indirectly connected users i and m and N (p) is the set of
nodes on the shortest path p, p ∈ Pni,m, we define the social
strength between i and m from i’s perspective over an n-hop
shortest path as:
SSn(i,m) = 1−
∏
p∈Pn
i,m
(1−
min
j,...,k∈N (p)
[NW (i, j), ..., NW (k,m)]
n
)
(1)
This definition uses the normalized direct social weight
NW (i, j) between two directly connected users i and j,
defined as follows:
NW (i, j) =
∑
∀λ∈Λi,j ω(i, j, λ)∑
∀k∈Ni
∑
∀λ∈Λi,k ω(i, k, λ)
(2)
Equation 2 calculates the strength of a direct relationship by
considering all types of interactions λ ∈ Λ between the users
i and j such as, let’s say, phone calls, interactions in online
games, and similar ratings on Netflix (observation O3). These
interactions are normalized to the total amount of interactions
of type λ that i has with other individuals. This approach en-
sures the asymmetry of social weight (observation O4) in two
ways: first, it captures the cases where ω(i, j, λ) 6= ω(j, i, λ)
(such as in a phone call graph). Second, by normalizing to
the number of interactions within one’s own social circle, the
relative weight of the mutual tie will be different for the two
users involved even in undirected social graphs (that is, when
ω(i, j, λ) = ω(j, i, λ)).
The implementation of observations O1, O3 and O4 in
the definition of the NW function is naturally carried over
in the definition of social strength from Eq. 1. Moreover, O3
is additionally implemented by considering the product over
all shortest paths p that connect two users. O2 is implemented
by considering the weakest link (minimum normalized weight
of all direct ties on each path) and by dividing it with the
distance n between the users.
The proposed social strength measure can:
• Quantify the indirect tie strength for nodes indirectly
connected at any social distance.
• Treat indirect ties between two nodes as possibly asym-
metric in strength rather than constraining the values to be
equal.
• Be more sensitive to strength differences because it uses
both edge weights and number of paths to calculate a value.
• Be calculated locally and so implemented on very large
graphs in parallel easily.
IV. SOCIAL STRENGTH VERIFICATION
Studies show that interviews meant to quantify the strength
or even the existence of social relationships are unreliable [27],
as subjects do not accurately recall [28] or are unable to
objectively asses their social relationships. To verify the social
strength metric proposed in Secion III, we thus chose to
quantitatively compare social strength with other metrics, even
when the comparison can be done on a limited domain. We
identified two such metrics of relevance: the overlap of the so-
cial neighborhoods and the frequency of interactions in online
social networks. However, both have limited applicability: The
overlap of social neighborhoods is possibly non-empty only for
nodes at distance at most 2. The frequency of interaction is
by definition only possible for direct social interactions, thus
directly connected nodes.
The strength of a relationship between two nodes in a
social graph was shown to correlate with the overlap of their
social neighborhoods in various studies. Intuitively, the more
friends in common, the closer the relationship between two
subjects. This hypothesis was verified at scale by studying
a who-talks-to-whom real-world mobile phone network [16],
and demonstrating that neighborhood overlap increases with
increasing tie strength.
Interaction graphs were shown to provide more accurate
representation of social ties than just the existence of declared
relationships in OSNs [24], [29]. As social interactions always
require some kind of investment of time and effort from partici-
pants, the frequency of interaction is an informative measure of
tie strength. Gilbert et al. [7] classified tie strengths according
to users’ attributes on social media such as intimacy and
interaction intensity. Likewise, Marlow et at. [30] investigated
users’ tweet and retweet interactions on Twitter to distinguish
a user’s strong ties from weak ties over an observation period.
Thus, both the neighborhoods overlap and the frequency
of interactions between two users are considered quantifiers
of social ties. In this section, we compare our proposed social
strength metric with these two accepted metrics.
A. Datasets
We used three social networks for the validation of the
social strength metric and for the rest of the experimental
evaluations in this paper. The first two (CA-I and CA-II) are
co-authorship networks from ArnetMiner [31] and the third
(TF2) is derived from gameplay logs from a Team Fortress 2
online gaming server.
ArnetMiner mines the academic social network to provide
domain-specific search services for researchers. From this
service, Tang et. al [32] extracted a weighted co-authorship
graph of Computer Science researchers from a variety of
domains. Nodes in this graph represent authors and are labeled
with the author’s affiliation. Edges exist if the two researchers
co-authored at least one paper together and are weighted with
the number of papers co-authored. The dataset also provides
the authors’ affiliations. From this dataset we extracted two
networks: Co-authorship I (CA-I) is a small connected compo-
nent with 348 nodes and a relatively low density (see Table I).
Co-authorship II (CA-II) is the largest connected component
of the ArnetMiner co-authorship network, comprising 1,127
nodes and having a density one order of magnitude higher
than CA-I.
Team Fortress 2 is an objective-oriented first person shooter
game released in 2007. We obtained just over 10 months of
gameplay traces (from April 1, 2011 to February 3, 2012)
from a Team Fortress 2 server located in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia [33]. The logs include game-based interactions among
players, such as teammates capturing territory together, or
players from opposing teams “killing” each other. In addition,
we crawled the Steam Community online social network [34]
and obtained the set of friends for each player in the server
logs [35]. We were able to tie a player on the server to
an OSN profile because Team Fortress 2 uses the Steam
gaming platform, which includes Steam Community, among
other gaming specific services. The Team Fortress 2 interacting
friends network (TF2) is composed of edges between players
who had at least one in-game interaction while playing together
on this particular server, and also have a declared friendship
in Steam Community. This dataset has two advantages over
the Steam declared OSN: First, it provides the number of in-
game interactions that quantifies the strength of a declared
social tie. Second, it provides players’ online/offline status
that we use later in the experiments in Section V. Over a
pure in-game interaction network, it provides the advantage of
selecting the most representative social ties, as proven in [33].
In this network of 2,406 nodes and over 9,000 edges, edge
weights thus represent the number of in-game interactions.
A brief characterization of the networks appears in Ta-
ble I. Figure 1 plots the degree, edge weight, and clustering
coefficient distributions for each of our networks. In order to
compare the weight distribution between different networks,
we normalized all edge weights by dividing them to the largest
edge weight in the corresponding network.
B. Social Strength vs. Neighborhood Overlap
The overlap between the social neighborhoods of two users
s and r can be represented by the Jaccard coefficient defined
TABLE I: Characteristics of the social networks used in experiments.
Networks # Nodes # Edges Avg. Path Length Density Clustering Coef. Assort. Diam. Range edge weights
CA-I 348 595 6.1 0.0098 0.28 0.173 14 [1–52]
CA-II 1,127 6,690 3.4 0.0100 0.33 0.211 11 [1–127]
TF2 2,406 9,720 4.2 0.0034 0.21 0.028 12 [1–21,767]
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Fig. 1: CDF of the three networks’ degree, weight and clustering coefficient distributions. Edge weight distributions are normalized
to allow for comparison among the three networks.
as follows:
JC(s, r) =
nsr
degree(s) + degree(r)− nsr (3)
where nsr is the number of mutual neighbors of nodes s and
r, and degree(s) and degree(r) are the number of edges of
nodes s and r, respectively.
There are some immediate observations: JC(s, r) is sym-
metrical, that is, JC(s, r) = JC(r, s). Also, JC(s, r) = 0 for
all nodes s and r situated in the network at a distance larger
than 2 hops. Meanwhile, social strength is used for quantifying
the strength of indirect social ties of at least 2 hops distance
in the social graph. Therefore, for a meaningful comparison
between JC(s, r) and the social strength between the same
nodes s and r, SSn(s, r), we select only those nodes s and r
for which n = 2.
Table II shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between
JC(s, r) and S2(s, r) for all pairs of nodes (s, r) situated at
distance 2 in the social graphs (all p-values ≤ 2.2 × 10−16).
All three datasets present positive correlations. In the CA-
II network the correlation is the highest (0.41), while TF2
shows only a weak positive correlation. Because TF2 is ex-
tracted from an online gaming social network, players establish
connections according to their gaming interests or to the
requirements of the game, rather than according to genuine
social phenomena. For example, many players add others
as their social connections to satisfy the minimum number
of participants required for playing the game, but end up
having few interactions. Thus, in this scenario, the overlap of
neighborhoods may not accurately capture meaningful social
ties without considering the frequency of users interactions.
In contrast, social strength evaluates social closeness by
including both shared paths and interactions between users,
which calibrates social ties more meaningfully.
TABLE II: Pearson correlation coefficients (PC) between the
Jaccard coefficient and social strength over 2-hop paths.
Networks PC(JC, SS2)
CA-I 0.255
CA-II 0.410
TF2 0.137
C. Social Strength vs. Number of Interactions
A common measure of the strength of a direct social tie
is the number/frequency/duration of interactions [9], [36]. In
order to compare social strength (a measure of the strength
of an indirect social tie) with the strength of a direct tie
as given by the number of direct social interactions, we do
the following: for closed triads in the social graph (such as
depicted in Figure 2a), we calculate the correlation between
the social strength of A and B along the path A−C −B by
ignoring the direct tie A−B (as depicted in Figure 2b) and the
number of interactions between A and B. Because the overlap
of the social neighborhoods of directly connected nodes A and
B is also a measure of the intensity of the social tie [16], we
also include the Jaccard coefficient of the direct tie A − B
in our comparison. (Note that this time we apply the Jaccard
coefficient to direct ties, not to 2-hop distant nodes, as in the
previous section).
The intuition for this experiment is the following: if the
social strength metric indeed captures the strength of an
indirect tie between A and B, then this metric should correlate
with measures of strength on the direct tie A−B. In Table III,
column 2 to 4 present the Pearson correlation among the num-
ber of direct interactions, 1-hop Jaccard coefficient, and the
social strength value along n-hop (n is the shortest path length)
paths for pairs of directly connected users. The results show
that all correlations are positive (with p-values ≤ 8.8× 10−8).
Moreover, it results that social strength is a better predictor
of the intensity of a social relationship than the Jaccard
index: social strength has higher positive correlation with edge
weights than the Jaccard coefficient in all three datasets, with
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Fig. 2: Using 2-hop social strength metrics to infer 1-hop social
strength values: (a) original graph (b) remaining graph after
removing edge AB (c) graph without 2-hop length paths (d)
graph with only one shared edge between A and B.
the highest positive correlation value in the CA-II network.
This result is mainly due to the fact that the Jaccard coefficient
metric does not takes edge weights into consideration, while
social strength considers both edge weights and shared paths
for quantifying users’ social closeness.
However, removing edges such as A–B could lead to
situations such as those in Figures 2c and 2d, where A and B
get disconnected or remain connected by shortest path of 3 or
more. In the case of Figure 2c, the Jaccard coefficient becomes
0 while the social strength can still be computed as SS3(A,B)
along the path A–C–D–B. In the case of Figure 2d, both
social strength and the Jaccard coefficient become 0, which
might bias the results. Column 5 to 7 in Table III present
the correlations among the three metrics after removing all
such zero values in each dataset (all p-values ≤ 0.01). The
percentage of removed data is presented in the 8th column.
Even in this case when we remove all the special zero values
and re-calculate the Pearson coefficient, social strength values
rarely change and have higher correlation with edge weights
than the Jaccard coefficient has.
To conclude, the above experiments show that our def-
inition of social strength SSn among indirectly connected
individuals in a social graph is positively correlated to both
neighborhood overlaps and the frequency of interactions. Con-
sequently, since the neighborhood overlap and the frequency of
interactions are considered to accurately estimate the strength
of social ties, then SSn can also be used for indicating the
closeness of social relationships among people. The difference
is that the neighborhood overlap and the frequency of interac-
tions are limited to quantifying the intensity of direct or at most
2-hop away social ties, while the social strength can estimate
the intensity of ties between people who are n-hop distant in
the social graph.
V. USING SOCIAL STRENGTH IN FRIEND-TO-FRIEND
STORAGE SYSTEMS
A Friend-to-Friend (F2F) storage system is a distributed
system where users use incentives to get access to the avail-
able storage resources or services of their friends’ machines.
While a promising alternative to cloud-based data backup, F2F
storage systems were shown to suffer from two significant
limitations. First, users with a small set of friends are penalized
by lack of available storage for their needs [5]. Second, friends
are typically in close geographical proximity, and thus their
online times are synchronized, leading to high unavailability
to their friends’ data [13]. These concerns can intuitively be
addressed by leveraging social strength SSn (where n ≥ 2) to
expand the set of storage resources while still using a measure
of social incentives.
In this section we verify whether SSn can improve the
service performance in F2F storage systems. To maintain a
meaningful value of social incentives, we restrict our evalua-
tions to n = 2 and n = 3. Our objectives are:
• To understand if SSn expands the size of candidate sets.
• To evaluate the benefits of using SSn to improve data
availability in F2F systems.
A. Experimental Setup
Details of algorithmic and empirical assumptions made in
our experiments are presented in the following.
1) Expansion algorithm: A user is not expected to trust
all his friends of friends to store his or her data: some of
them can be just weak connections of his weaker direct social
ties, for example. We use the quantitative power of SS to
select the reasonably strong indirect connections and guarantee
comparable social strength with the user’s 1-hop friends.
The expansion algorithm follows two steps:
• For each user i, find the weakest direct social contact
p such that NW (i, p) = min
j∈Neigh(i)
[NW (i, j)]. Let this
minimum normalized weight be referred to as θi.
• For each m of i’s n-hop friends, if SSn(i,m) ≥ θi, the
user m is inserted in the candidate peer set of i. Intuitively,
this ensures that the social strength between i and m,
located at distance n in the social graph, is at least as
strong as i’s weakest direct tie.
We note that the algorithm expands each candidate-set us-
ing a user-specific, thus local, threshold. Such local thresholds
are needed in the distributed setting of a F2F system.
2) Online Presence Behavior: To estimate peer avail-
ability, we augmented each network with online presence
empirically deduced from various real traces. For CA-I and
CA-II, we fit a distribution to online presence information
extracted from empirical Skype traces presented in [13]. The
distribution was applied to each author by shifting it to match
the timezone of his or her affiliation. As seen in Figure 3,
which plots the percentage of users online per hour of the
day, at least 25% of nodes are online at any given time, with
the peak and valley occurring at about 1:00 AM and noon,
respectively.
For the TF2 network, we used one month of the empir-
ical playing times of the gamers. We plot the corresponding
aggregate distribution in Figure 4, which shows each week’s
online presence per hour for May 2011. The distribution shows
clear diurnal and domain-specific activity patterns. As noted
in [33], gaming is not an activity conducive to multi-tasking.
Therefore, we see an elevated level of presence on weekends
and during non-working hours. Although peak presence occurs
consistently in the early morning with more than 20% of users
online, there are almost no users online at noon.
TABLE III: Pearson coefficient (PC) among edge weights, Jaccard coefficient and the social strength over 1-hop paths and the
same correlations by removing zeros in special cases.
Networks PC(weight, JC) PC(weight, SS1) PC(JC, SS1) PC nonzero(weight, JC) PC nonzero(weight, SS1) PC nonzero(JC, SS1) % of Removed Zeros
CA-I 0.179 0.238 0.655 0.173 0.244 0.530 24.7%
CA-II 0.211 0.394 0.591 0.210 0.396 0.580 2%
TF2 0.173 0.267 0.554 0.135 0.245 0.492 13.2%
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Fig. 3: Online behavior of nodes in empirical traces of Skype.
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Fig. 4: Online behavior of players per hour of the week in
May for TF2.
To determine whether the social strength selection mecha-
nism improves the potential availability of storage resources,
we measure the percentage of a node’s selected candidates
available throughout the day, by binning online presence into
1-hour time slots. If a user was online at some point during a
time slot, we mark him as available for that time slot. Methods
that store files in a distributed fashion such as erasure codes
require k storage sites to be available for retrieving a file. Thus,
we also vary the number of friends necessary for a node’s
storage needs to be met under such storage schemes. We then
measure the fraction of nodes who have enough candidates
online to meet their needs when selected by either the 1-hop
or social strength mechanisms.
3) Data placement: Replicating data at all friends allows
a user to get maximum achievable data coverage but results in
high costs for storing and transferring data to multiple copies,
in particular for users with a large number of friends. So we
adapt the greedy heuristic data placement algorithm proposed
in [37] to backup files with a subset of friends who can cover
TABLE IV: Candidate set expansion via SS2 and SS3: per-
centage of expanded users, expansion nodes and rate.
% expanded users expansion: med, max expansion rate: med, avg, max
Net. n=2 n=3 n=2 n=3 n=2 n=3
CA-I 34.2 10.6 0, 19 0, 19 0, 0.2, 1.6 0, 0.1, 1.1
CA-II 63.6 51.2 3, 459 1, 474 0.5, 1.3, 6.1 0.1, 3.1, 23.3
TF2 36.6 27.2 0, 988 0, 1032 0, 2.5, 36 0, 1.8, 116.5
the maximum online time. In this heuristic, to get maximum
possible time slots coverage (e.g., 24 hours), users first pick
the friend who is able to cover as many time slots as possible,
then pick the second friend to maximum cover the remaining
not covered time slots, and keep doing this until all the possible
time slots are covered.
B. Results
1) Expanding Peer Sets: Since the most intuitive advantage
of our mechanism is an increase in the number of storage
candidates, we begin by evaluating how much the candidates
set is expanded. We thus implemented SSn presented in Eq. 1
and report the size of the candidate set selected based on the
expansion algorithm presented in Section V-A1 on the three
networks described in Section IV-A.
Table IV shows high level statistics on how candidate sets
are expanded with 2- and 3-hop social distance respectively in
each of our three networks. For 2-hop expansion, 63.6% users
in CA-II and 36.6% of players in TF2 expanded their candidate
sets. Even in the sparse CA-I, 34.2% users augmented their
peer-set.
When using only the 3-hop neighborhood to recruit peer
candidates p who satisfy the requirement that SS3(i, p) ≥ θ(i)
the expansion is still taking place in all three networks: even in
the sparse network CA-I, 10.6% users augment their friendsets
and about 1% users have expanded their candidates with more
than five friends. The denser network CA-II has more than
50% users expanding their candidate sets, and TF2 has 27.2%
(with the number of expanded 3-hop friends being 1,032). As
expected, 3-hop augmentation is not as strong as 2 hops’ since
as the social distance increases, the social strength weakens.
Yet a number of users can still recruit more peers when
increasing the social distance. Thus, using social strength for
recruiting resources indirectly connected in the social graph
can successfully augment users’ peer-sets and potentially solve
problems caused by the limited number of friends in F2F
systems.
Figure 5 examines the effects of the social strength mech-
anism from a different perspective. It plots the degree of
a user vs. the size of her expanded candidate set. For the
most part, all users expand their candidate set, with CA-II
showing linear growth in 2-hop distance as the user’s degree
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 18
 20
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
N
um
be
r o
f f
rie
nd
s e
xp
an
de
d
Degree
CA-I
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Degree
CA-II
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 0  50  100  150  200  250
Degree
TF2
2 hops
3 hops
Fig. 5: Expanded candidate set size as a function of node
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Fig. 6: Average fraction of available candidates per hour for
CA-I and CA-II.
increases. As expected, the number of expanded friends is
positively correlated to users’ social degrees in both 2- and
3-hop expansion.
2) Online Storage Availability: Figures 6 and 7 plot the
average fraction of users whose storage needs are met with
the requirement that at least k ∈ {1, 3, 6} candidates are
online at a given time for the co-authorship networks and
TF2, respectively. For CA-I and CA-II, each data point is the
average of 10 times iterations. Error bars represent the 95%
confidence interval. Three scenarios are compared: storage
candidates are selected only from direct social contacts; and
storage candidates are selected from those located at least n
hops away with a strong enough social strength SSn, where
n = 2 and n = 3.
Using social strength results in a higher fraction of can-
didate sets meeting the storage requirements: in our exper-
iments, social strength lead up to 20% improvements on
data availability. In particular, when 6 friends are needed to
cooperate on completing a storage task, at least 5% higher
data availability can be reached. Further, the social strength
mechanism does not degrade as quickly as the 1-hop selection
when increasing the number of friends that are required to be
online simultaneously. We also see that for sparse networks
like CA-I, social strength over larger distance n significantly
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Fig. 7: Average fraction of available candidates per hour of
the week for TF2.
improves data availability, especially when larger number of
friends are required to be online simultaneously.
Finally, CA-II shows higher levels of availability than CA-
I under the same conditions. This is likely because CA-II
has more users with larger expanded candidate sets under the
social strength mechanism than CA-I (Figure 1). Moreover,
we note that CA-I shows better performance than TF2 under
the same requirements. In the scenario that requires at least
one friend online, 73% of users in CA-I have candidates
available at midnight, compared to only 20% of TF2 users. One
explanation could be due to the limited number of concurrent
players the gaming server supports (at most 32 simultaneous
players). Another explanation is that CA-I users are spread
out over multiple timezones, while most of the TF2 users are
geographically close to the server to minimize latency, and
thus are time synchronized in their gaming patterns.
To conclude, using datasets from co-authorship networks
and a video gaming community, we show that the social
strength-based mechanism more than doubles the set of storage
candidates potentially motivated by social incentives, and
improves the data availability of storage resources by up to
20% with 3-hop social strength.
VI. USING SOCIAL STRENGTH FOR PREDICTING
INFORMATION DIFFUSION PATHS
The diffusion of information is a fundamental process
in OSNs. Our social strength metric can be used to infer
information diffusion paths between indirectly connected users
in the social graph. I.e., if we know someone who received
the information at t0, then we can directly predict the infected
users at tn (n ≥ 2) instead of step-wise, e.g., at t1.
Predictions over such longer intervals could help OSN
providers customize strategies for preventing or accelerating
information spreading. For example, to contain rumors, OSN
providers could block related messages sent to the suscep-
tible users several time steps before the rumor arrives, or
disseminate official anti-rumor messages in advance. Similarly,
advertisers could accelerate their advertisements spreading in
the network by discovering who will be the next susceptible to
infection. This n-hop long paths prediction can supply more
time for decision makers to contain harmful disseminations,
and to choose users who are pivotal in information spreading
for targeted advertisements.
This section describes our experiments of applying the
social strength metric to information diffusion path prediction.
A. Experimental Setup
For simplicity, we focus on predicting diffusion paths at 2-
and 3-hop distance with a single seed source. A single node
is chosen as the original source of information at t0. We then
predict the nodes that will accept the information at tn with
the knowledge from t0. All other n-hop (n ≥ 4) paths and
multiple seeds can be extended from 2 and 3 hops.
1) Diffusion simulation: As ground truth, we used the
widely accepted Susceptible-Infected (SI) model [38] to sim-
ulate the diffusion process and recorded the diffusion paths,
i.e., which nodes are affected during each time step. The SI
model is a probability-based diffusion model where nodes can
be in one of two states: susceptible or infected. We say a
node has accepted the information if it is infected, and once
infected, can never return to the susceptible state. The input of
the simulation is a weighted graph where weights represent a
quantification of the social ties between two directly connected
nodes.
For simplicity, we set the spreading probability from an
infected node vi to its nearest neighbor vj proportional to the
edge weight wi,j . Introducing a constant of proportionality β,
the time-independent probability of passing information from
vi to vj can be written as Pi,j = βwij , where increasing β
results in an overall increased probability of infection. We set
β = 1max(wij) (inversely proportional to the global maximum
edge weight in the graph), in which case Pi,j = 1 for the
globally strongest link, and Pi,j < 1 for all others. We set a
threshold p0, which is in the range between the minimum Pmin
and the maximum Pmax. When p0 = Pmin, the information
will disseminate to all the nodes in the graph. Conversely,
if p0 = Pmax, almost no diffusion will occur. If Pij ≥ p0,
information will spread through the edge (i, j), and not spread
otherwise. The initial seed, i.e., the node infected at t0, is
randomly selected at the beginning of the simulation.
2) Predicting diffusion paths via social strength: Once we
generate the ground truth from the SI model, we then use social
strength to predict the path of diffusion. We calculate social
strength values between the seed and its n-hop friends, then
convert the social strength values to a social rank. Each user
has a rank list for all his or her friends according to the social
strength value between said user and the friend. Because of
the asymmetric characteristic of the social strength metric, the
converted social ranks are also asymmetric.
After obtaining social ranks, we need a cut-off threshold to
decide whether or not a node’s n-hop friends will be infected
at tn. The strategy we adopt here is that the social ranks from
both perspectives must be high, e.g., socialrankn(A,B) and
socialrankn(B,A) both rank among the top 10% of both user
A and B’s friends. Then, the cut-off threshold can classify a
node’s n-hop friends into two categories: information-accepted
(infected) or information-denied nodes at tn. The intuition of
this cut-off is that users will both prefer to send information to
their “closest” social ties and will likely believe the information
from their “closest” social ties.
3) Prediction evaluation: We compare the prediction re-
sults with the ground truth obtained from the diffusion sim-
ulation to verify the effectiveness of the social strength in
predicting diffusion paths. We evaluate our method using three
metrics.
• Accuracy is the proportion of true results in the population.
accuracy = # of true positives+ # of true negativespopulation size
• Sensitivity, also called the true positive rate, measures the
proportion of actual positives that are correctly predicted.
sensitivity = # of true positives# of true positives+# of false negatives
• Specificity evaluates the proportion of negatives which are
correctly identified.
specificity = # of true negatives# of true negatives+# of false positives
B. Results and Evaluation
We used the three datasets (CA-I, CA-II and TF2) as
described in the previous section. Results are presented as
the average of 100 iterations. We varied the threshold p0 to
examine the effect of prediction results in scenarios ranging
from complete propagation to nearly none. The threshold
ranges we chose are based on the edge probability distribution
plotted in Figure 8. For example, in CA-II, 49.3% of edge
probabilities are smaller than 0.007. Thus, setting p0 < 0.007
results in complete diffusion in the network. Conversely, 94.1%
edge probabilities are smaller than 0.07, so setting p0 >
0.07 leads to almost no propagation. Therefore, we test the
power of social strength for predicting diffusion paths when
the threshold varied from 0.007 to 0.07. Similarly, we choose
0.01 and 0.1 as the range of thresholds of CA-I and 0 and
0.018 for CA-II.
The prediction results via SS2 and SS3 are shown in
Figure 9. We see that for 2-hop social strength prediction,
besides complete infection scenarios, the sensitivities are above
0.64, reaching a maximum of 0.887 in CA-II. Also, the
specificities and the accuracies in all cases are always higher
than 0.74, with the highest accuracy (0.935) occurring in TF2
when p0 = 0.018. Although 3-hop predictions show decreased
sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy compared to 2-hop results,
they remain above 0.5.
To better demonstrate social strength’s effective power
on inferring diffusion processes, we consider the following
baseline method: assume all of a user’s 2 and 3-hop friends
accept the information in t2 and t3. We compare our prediction
results via SS2 and SS3 with the baseline in Figures 10 and 11.
The baseline performance is very low when networks are
not completely diffused while the social strength predictive
method achieves peak performance at around 0.89, 0.79, and
0.82 for sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy, respectively. It is
important to note that these three networks have very different
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CA-II and TF2.
network structure (from sparse to dense), yet the performance
of social strength is consistently higher than the baseline in all
three networks.
From all these results, we conclude that social strength is
useful to predict who will be infected, or along which paths
information propagates, at least 2-3 steps before a susceptible
node is even in contact with an infected node. Even if the
accuracy of the prediction decreases with distance for n = 3,
there are significant benefits in being 3 time steps ahead of the
infection.
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Fig. 9: Sensitivity, specificity and accuracy when using social
strength to predict information dissemination in CA-I, CA-II
and TF2.
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Fig. 10: Comparison between the performances of prediction
using 2-hop social strength (SS2)) and the baseline.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1
ac
cu
ra
cy
Threshold
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07
Threshold
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.004  0.008  0.012  0.016
Threshold
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1
 
sp
ec
ifi
ci
ty
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.004  0.008  0.012  0.016
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1
se
n
sit
iv
ity
CA-I (3 hops)
social strength sensitivity
baseline sentivity
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07
CA-II (3 hops)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.004  0.008  0.012  0.016
TF2 (3 hops)
Fig. 11: Comparison between the performances of prediction
using 3-hop social strength (SS3)) and the baseline.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We introduced a social strength metric to measure the
strength of indirect social ties by considering both the intensity
of interactions and the number of connected paths. We showed
that our metric is positively correlated with the Jaccard index
and with the interaction frequency along direct social ties,
indicating that it is an accurate quantification of the intensity
of a(n indirect) social relationship.
We proved its applicability to two socially informed appli-
cations: friend-to-friend storage sharing systems and predicting
information diffusion in a social graph. Based on empirical
data, our experimental evaluations demonstrate that using
the social strength metric is beneficial in both cases. First,
for the average user in the social graph, it helps identify
indirectly connected peers with whom the user has a significant
social strength that could act as social incentive in a resource
sharing environment, thus significantly increasing the pool of
resources available to the user. Second, because indirect ties
diversify the pool of users (in this case, by covering more
time zones), resource availability increases significantly. Third,
social strength accurately predicts information diffusion paths
at least 2 steps ahead, which enables intervention mechanisms
for rumor squelching and targeted information injection.
A variety of socially aware applications can benefit from
the social strength metric. For example, link prediction based
on social strength could discover more potentially useful
contacts and improve link recommendation accuracy. Automat-
ically setting default privacy controls based on social strength
is likely to be more accurate than using graph distance alone.
Employing social strength in graph partitioning will have the
benefits of relying on local computation, thus allowing for
more decentralized and scalable algorithms. Finally, in decen-
tralized OSNs, users’ augmented social strength-based friend-
sets could provide a more efficient and privacy-guaranteed
technique to propagate updates in the presence of churn.
This work is a first step in understanding the value of
and the methodology for quantifying the strength of indirect
social ties. In addition to exploring the applicability space,
there are aspects related to privacy and security that need to
be understood. Intuitively, because of the local exploration of
one’s social neighborhood for computing social strength, the
risks are contained, especially compared to approaches that
require the global graph. However, a formal study of this topic
is required for building a practical framework that enables the
implementation and adoption of the social strength metric for
indirect ties.
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